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INSANITY AS A DFENSE TO CRIMI T IAL ACTS.

StAtutes were framed and principles of law were
laid down regulating the legal relations of the insane
long before physicians had acquired any accurate notions
respecting their malady;

and, as might be expected, er-

ror and injustice have been committed to an incalculable
extent under the revered name of law.

The actual state

of our knowledge of insanity as well as of other diseases, so far from being what it once was, is now the accumulated result of observatio' aided and guided more
or less by a deductive philosophy.

The world owes a

debt of gratitude to the celebrated Pine],

who with an

ardor of philanthropy that no discouragement could
quench, and a courage that no apprehension of danger

could daunt, succeeded, at last, in removing the chains
of the maniac and establishing his claims to all the
liberties and comforts his condition left him capable
of enjoying.
Iii all civilized communiities, ancient or modern,
some forms of insanity have been regarded as exemptinfrom the punishment of crime, and under some circumstanc-

es at least,

were affected by it.
of opi.ion consists iq
sane in

the civil acts of those who

as vitiatiii,

The only difficulty or div' rsity
ascert-iiriri- who are really in-

the meaning of the law,

which has beea content

with merely laying- down some *:elieral priaciples and
leavin- their applicatio i to the discretio
a -thorities.

of judici.l

The frequency with which insanity is

pl-aded in defense of crime, the magnitude of the consequences to the parties concerned, and the perpleities in which the discussion it occasions involves the
minds of the judges and jurors,

are ample re>asons why

the law relative to insanity should be simple and easily understood,

a result that can only be obtained by

direct legislative eaactments.

It is time for a le-is-

lature to determine what,

amid the mass of coiflictina

opinions on this subject,

shall be the law of the laud;

and thus

i( longer to permit the lives and liberties of

the people to be suspended on the dicta of men whose
knowledge of insanity is exceedingly imperfect, and
whose decisions have not even the merit of uniformity
and consisteu-cy.
No state or legislative power in the country has
liven anywhere near a lucid and inst Uctive statute on

the subject.
hlas
in

beeni the
reference

It may be well, therefor'e, to s(.re what
le-izlationa of vario-lis enligihtened
to this

code contains

this

subject.
passa-e:

under gener:l mania
ished as criminals,

The

-Lnvarian criminal

"IMinors and those 1lborivig

or halluciiiatiot,
nor,

uatioit-

cannot be pun-

generally speakin-,

can other's

be puiished who have committed a crime while deprived
of the use of their mind."
the following:

In the Saxon code we find

"Responsibility

is

annulled

in

persons

who are deprived of the use of reason by mental disease. "

In

the study of the English Common Law decisions,

we have too often seen the deplorable failure of such
general terms to protect the miserable subjects of disease.

Iti some of the later

made to avoid the

Codes an attempt has beea

objection to gerieral

terms by mentioti-

in- various mental diseases as illustrations of the
meanin-z intended to be conveyed.

In the proposed code

of the &rand Duchy of Yesse, so says Mittermaier, we
find the followinL:

"By reason of their impaired res-

ponsibility, punishment cannot be inflicted upon those
who commit penal acts in

a

state

of sleep,

of somnam-

bulism, of general mania, general and partial hallucination,

of imbecility or any other mental disorder,

which either takes away all conscio-ostiess r'-,spectinthe act generally
ii conajutnction
rtsistably

and its

relation

with some peculiar

impells him,

or

to the penal law,
bodily condiLiori,

completely unconscious,

ir-

to vi-

olent acts."
In

the code of the arand Duchy of Baden, it is

eniacted as follows: "Responsibility is ai-inulled in that
condition in

which either

consciousness

of the crimin-

ality of the offense or the free will of the offender
is takei

away.

To the condition which annulls respons-

ibility on the strength of the foregoin, act beloachiefly:

imbecility, hallucination, general mania, dis-

traction and complete confusion of the senses

or under-

standing. "
Because

of the difficulties

incumbent upon the use

of such terms, and to bring the wretched subjects of
mental disorder under the protection of the law, withoiut discrimination, the legislator has in some instances
made

the fact of the presence of disease of the mind

sufficient reason to an,,ul criminal responsibility.

In

Livin2gston's code it is provided, that no act done by
a person in the state of insanity can be punished as an
o IFf
e us e.
The Penal Code of ilinnesota, Sections 19 & 21, pro-

vides that mental unsoundness
crime, unless it

shall be no ezcuse for

is shown that the act was done while

the defendant was laboring under such defect of reason
as either not to know the natnre and quality of the act,
or that it was wrong,

or that a morbid propensity to

commit prohibited acts shall be no excuse for their
commission unless defendant is shown to be incapable of
knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, or an uncontrol!able and insane impulse to commit crime, in one who is
conscious of the nature and Auality of the act.
The Revised Statutes of krkansas provides that a
lunatic, or insane person, without lncid intervals,
shall not be founid guilty of any crime or misdemeanor
with which he may be charged.
The criminal code of Germany contains the following provision, which is said to have been the formulated result of very able discussion both by lawyers and
physicians of that country.

"There

is no criminal lia-

bility when the actor at the time of the offense

is in

a state of unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of
the mind, through which the free determination of his
will does not act."
The French code provides that there can be no

crime or offense if the accused was
ness at the time of the act.

iii a state of mad-

For some time the French

tribunals were inclined and in fact did interpret this
law in such a manner as to follow the law of England,
but now this construction has been abandoned and the
modern view of the medical profession is now adopted
and followed in that country.
It seems, after a careful examination of the statutes upon the subject and a review of the decisions on
insanity, that a statute like the followini- -ould better
promote the purposes of justice:

A person cannot be

punished for a crime conmitted while he is in a state
of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity or in any
other state of mind in which the person is involuntarily deprived of the consciousness of the true nature of
his acts, or is in such a condition of mind caused by
disease of the mind as not to be able to control his
acts towards others.
It is a general rule, but not without exception,
that insanity once bein- established, responsibility is
taken away;

and all nice distinctions concerning the

degree, and the effect of this or that kind of mental
derangement, and the enact measure of reason that has
been left or taken away, are effectually precluded.

An

insane person, though it may be argued, may actually be
-uilty of a crimiaal act, the crime not being in the
range of his insanity, while by the letter of such a
law he must be acquitted.

To remedy this, add to the

proposed statute the words: ualess it can be proved that
the act was not committed through the influence of disease.
V It can be easily seen that when our statute makers came to frame statutes upon the subject of insanity,
they did nothing more, with few exceptions, than to declare the common law itself.

The common law had long

held that a man who was insane could not be held responsible for his acts.

As long ago as in the reign of

Fenry the Eighth, the year book published in the twentyfirst year of his reign tells us that a man was arraigned for the murder of a child, and that upon the
trial it was found that he was insane, and upon these
facts it was determined that he should go free quod
nota bone etc.,

but it goes no further than to say that

he should not be found guilty;

it does not give any in-

formation of the test by which the question of his insanity is to be determined, nor of the evidence required necessary to establish it.

The formulation
did nothinc- more

of the common law into statutes

thai, to briiner the subject before

the

notice of the people rid to place it ill a position that
it mi-ht not be

,ainsaid.

This much for statutory law on the subject of insanity.

7!o statute to my knowledge has defined the

term insanity.

They have done little more thain to in-

timate some of the obvious divisions.

In the Roman Law

the insane, or dementes, are divided into two classes:
those whose understanding is weak or dull, menti copti
and those who are restless

and furious,

furiotu-s.

The

French and Prussian codes make use of the terndemence,
fureur and imbecilite, without attemptijg to define
them.
The En-!ish Common Law originally
kinds of insanity:

reconized two

idiocy and lunacy, the

subjects of

which were designated by the terms non compos mentis,
which was used in a

-eneric sense, and meant to embrace

all who, from defect of the understaniding, required the
protection of the law.

Occasionally a jurist will at-

tempt to define and point out the persons afflicted
with various kinds atid degrees of insanity.

Lord Coke

says, "There are four kinds of men who may be said to
be non compos ment~s:

-

First, an idiot, who from his

nativity, by a perpetual infirmity is non compos;

Sc-

ond, anyone that by sickness, grief or accident wholly
Third,

loseth his memory and understandin.;

,L lunatic,

who has sometimes 1.uderstandin- and sometimes not, alequando

gaudet lucides iintervall-s,

and therefore is

called non compos mentis so long as h
stLzidili:
a tim1
ing,

has not under-

iourth, he that by his own vicious act for

depriveth himself of his memory and understnadas he that

is

drunkent."

Blackstone's understnadin-

of the term insane

person is one whose mind is affected by general imbecility, or is subject to one or more specific delusions;
and of the term lunatic, one who hath had understanding,
but by disease, grief or other accident, hath lost the
use of his memory and reason.

kn idiot is one who

had no utiderstandin- from his nativity.
The first attempt to point out precisely those
conditions of insanity in

which the

civil

and criminal

responsibilities are uiiequally affected was made by
Lord ~ale,

1 H. P.

insanity,"

says he,

C. page

290.

"and a total

"There

is

insanity.

a partial
The former

is either in respect to thiiigs quod hoc illud insanare.
Some persons that have a competent use of reason in respect to some particular discourses, subjects or appli-

cations,

or els J it

and this

is

is

iiL respect to dezrees;

partial

condition of very many,

the

especially mel-

ancholy persons, who for the most part display their
defect in excessive fears and griefs
of the use

wholly destitute

and yet are not

of reason* and the partial

insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of
any offense

in

matters

capital,

for doubtless most per-

sons that are felons of themselves, and others,

are

under a degree of partial insanity when they commit
those offenses.

It is very difficult to defilie the

visible line that divides perfect and partial iisanity.
But it must rest upon circumstances to be weighed and
considered both by judge and jury, lest on the one hand
there be a kind of inhumanity toward the defects of human nature, or on the other hand too great an indulgence
given to great crimes."

So stroag was the celebrated

jurist possessed that it is the strength and capacity
of the mind that are affected by insanity, that he actually founded upon it a test for criminal rm2sponsibility.
"Such

a person,"

says he,

"as

laboring under melancholy

distemper, hath yet ordiinarily as great understandin::as a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as
may be guilty of felony or treason."
By this rule Lord Fale makes the only difference

between total and partial insanity precisely that which
is made by differeaces of a-e, as if there could not be
two thin -:s more alikl,

than the mind of a person

labor-

in-n unde3r melancholy distemper and that of a child
fourteen years

old.

The doctriie thus domatically laid downi by Lord
Hale has exerted no inconsiderable influ-nce on th
dicial opinions of his successors;
ity

ju-

and his high a_-tthor-

has often been i.voked against the plea of insan-

ity whenever it has been ,-r-,d by the voice of philanthropy and true science.
indul 'erce in

I

consequnce

foi'cin- an unwarrantable

of the

comn,.on

construction

wheiever a point is to be gained, his principles have
been made to meain far more than ever by him desi-jued.
The fact teaches us the importance of clear aUd well
defined terms in the expression of scientific truths,
as well as of enlarged information relative
ject to which they belon-.

to the sub-

Iii the time of this eminent

jurist, insanity was a much less prevalent disease than
it

is

now,

and the popular opinions concernin- it were

derived from observations of the wretched inmates of
the madhouse, whom chains and stripes, cold and filth,
had reduced to the stupidity of ati

idiot, or exasper-

ated to the fury of a demon.
Until quite recently the course of practice in
the

Ei-.lish criminal

courts has been in

strict

conform-

ity

to th,

principles

laid Jown by Lord

al ,: that

partial insan-ity is no excuse for the commission
i!Is ;al act.
pao~e 763,

In

decided in

Justic.e Tracy
tic

humor,

of

the trial
1783,

observed,

rnold, 16 Fow.,

for shootin.

"It

is

Onslo, , L.

in

a man's

ac-

points him out to be such a mad-maii,

emptin-2

him Prom pI.Liishme it;

totally

deprived of understanding

not know what he is doin.,
brute or a wild beast;

it

Tr.

St.

not every kiud of fran-

or something unaccountable

tions that

of an

as ey-

must be a man that

is

and memory and does

no more than an infant,

a

such a person is never the ob-

ject of punuishment."
This is but the echo of Lord Hale's doctrine and
the circumstances of the case %

how faithfully these

priaciples were applied, but with more vigor, perhaps,
than the Lord would apply them had he been the presidIn 1812 in the trial of Bellin-ham,

ing jud-e.
ney &ibbs

said,"A man may be deranLged in iiind -

ttorhis in-

tellect may be insufficient for enabling him to coniduct
the common affairs of lif3, such as disposing of his
property, as

judgi!i, of, the claims which his respective

relations have uponi him, and if he be so, the administration of the county will take his affairs in band and

appoint trust,-es:

but at

thee

sam:

not dischar ed for his criminal

the sa ,tctioii

speech in
"I

defense of Urtfi

am bound,"

tinction

of his

he says,

between civil

'iven

the same doc-

in

his celebrat d

tUthority
,-d,

is

such a mia

acts."

Lord Erskine had previously
trine

time

27 flow. ,

"to admit there
and criminal

Tr. ,

St.

is

a widi
If

cases.

1182,
dis-

in

the

former a man appears upon the evid,ice to be non compos
me atis,

the law avoids his acts thou-h it

camenot be

traced or connected with the morbid ima-ination which
?o-stitutes his disease, which may be e t~nsively partial in the influence upon his conduct;

but to d,liver

a man from responsibility from crimes, above all for
crimes of great atrocity and wickedness, I am by no
means prepared to apply this rule however well established,

when property

is aot concerned."

That a person whom the law prevents from managing
his own property by reason of his mental impairment
should in respect to criminal acts be considered as
possessing all

the re uirements of responsibility,

and

placed on the same footilg as men of the strongest
minds,
few,
it

is a proposition so strange and startling that

uninfluenced

by professional

bias,

can yield to

unhesitating assent or look upon it in any other*

light

than as

>elo~igi~pr to that

may be the perfectioni
which appear to

b,

of r

cluss of doctrines

aso1 to the

initiated,

which
but

the hei :ht of absurdity to everyone

else.
The modern acceptationi of the term non compos
nm~ts is

its

use in

idiocy and lunacy.

a

eneric sense,

They both had in

includiing. both
the early Eniglish

and kmerican cases a more restricted meaning than they
have at present, and were held to impart a total deprivation of seanse,

and not to include mere imbecility and

weakness of mind.

In modern cases they are held not

only to include idiocy and lunacy as strictly

defined

by common law, but all cases of imbecility where the
subject is incapable of conductinl the ordinary affairs
of life

and liable to become the victim of his own

weakness.
An illustration of the modern acceptance of the
term insanity is brougxht out in the case of Loefles vs.
State, 10 Ohio St.,
inde,--d ezists in

598.

Justice Swan said, "Insanity

so many shapes and forms,

varied insi ,nia and manifestations,

that it

has so many
is

almost

impossible for science to comprehend it or -ive it iNtelli-ible definitions.
differ about it;

The learned and the unlearned

what is insanity to one is not to an-

,ud,-rstood by any of us,

well

seems ijde ,d as indefinite

in

lish Encyclopedia

or the result
ca sterility

extent as the mind its

If."

kmerican

idiocy consists

"that

says,

the

ina a

con;enital

either

development durig

of arrestd

and En£-

An idiot

in-- and one who is
as where

is

a person without understand-

!ea:-lly presumeJ

Liever to have

a person cannot count twenty or tell

had
his

name or age.

An idiot

is

of conmitting

a crime:

and where idiocy e1 ists in rf-

erence to the particular
acquittal."
is

considered at law incapable

act,

the court will direct

4 person born deaf an,

not considred an idiot,

e'ist

it

infancy;

of the mind -and not a perversion of the

n.iderstanidin-.

-ay,

It

of the mental f-acolties,

d~ficieny

is

learned or otherwise.

subject,

Put return to the

Inot

tioiis arnv

species and modific

The classes,

other.

in coniection

an

dumb but not blind,

yet the want of hearinE may

with responsibility

for crime,

and

if such person is shown to be able to comprehend the
nature

of his acts he may be convicted,

sons as are born beaf,
be idiots

but such per-

dumb and blind are presamed to

and not capable

of coniitting

presumption may be rebutted.

crime;

yet the

But in the case of deaf

mutes malice caninot be implied."

So much for idiots

etc.

Upou
ofi

'ii

ins,-inity,

examination
after

so insan-, in

the

of the eacly English cases

theory thift a p--rson had to

b.,

order to be exempted from his criminal

that he did not have atiy more r,' aon
an infant or an idiot,

had partly

within the meanin:

than a- wild beast,
iploded,

it

sems

who was really insane

for determinin-

that the test

acts,

of the law,

was

based upon the

the-

ory that a person in order to be protected for his
criminal acts, must be so affected by disease of the
mind as not to know that the particular act he was commit' ii

was wrong'.

,Je first

find the right

and wrong

test set forth and followed in the case of Edward Arnold,

16 Fow.

St.

Tr.

766,

in

which it

was said:

the defendant was under the visitation
could not know what he did,
reatest

acainst the law,

and that it
of the law."

but if

was wrong,

he is

St.

guilty of any of-

he did know what he did
not within the

e1 emption

The cases that followed this reco-.iized

it with few exceptions;
27 How.

and

though he committed the

offense, ye2t he could not be

fease

case

of God,

"If

Tr.

1282,

is

the case of John Hartfield,
a notable

exception.

Il

this

the defen(lant was arraigned for shooting at the

king and was acquitted upon the grounds
der an insane delusion,

that

that

he was un-

God had directed him to

shoot the kiL<.
The

rustion

which presents

ination of the early c'ises
at

is

as the test
for their

upo1

of ri

:ht

Ld wrong

for det~rmini ig who are really
criminal

ed by the courts,

acts.

This

I

responsible

<aI test,

as adopt-

was base d upon the prevailing medical

theory of that ax,.
of insanity in

an exam-

why should the courts

early adopt the knowledge

that

itslf

The physicians had never heard

the form of an insane deltsion or ati

irrisistible impulsa to do a certain act by which the
person affected cannot control his will power, although
he may know the act he is doin- is wrong, but the courts
havin- no other guide for a basis,

accepted the medi-

cal theory of that early day, and with few exceptioiis
have continued
hav

to follow it

many times refused to

until

the present day,

and

adopt th. more mod36rn theo-

ries of the physiciaLns a nd some courts as to the true
test

of one's responisibility for criminal

acts when

affected with insanity, which true science and adva;i3cd

civilizatio.n

calls for.

The question of whether the courts of En land wre
to recognize any other form of insanity than that which
was accepted by them and founded upon theories of the
physicians, advancsd a hundred years befor,

came up in

the IVJcaughte

case,

ei'2ht eAperts

10 6.

L F.

200,

"- ve their opiiions going to show that th

dJfendant had committed the act in
iJflueaice of a morbid delusion,
the powder of self control.
stance

Upon the trial

rIujstioji und r the

which d.zprived him of

Their testimony in

As that the knowledge

sub-

of right and wrong was

inot the test to determine his responsibility.
The medical testimony was so strong that the
court stopped the trial, substantially directing thejury to acquit defendant, but Chief Justice Tinidal instructad the jury that the knowledge was th? test, followin g the old rule.
House of Lords,

This decision was referred to the

by which it

was subsequently sustained.

The pritciples established by this decision have remaifned the law of England until the present day and
have been adopted in

many of the states.

The propositions are the followin- in substance:
1st:-

The jury ought to be told in every case

that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess
a sufficieit degree of reason to be responsible for
his crime, until the contrary be proven to their satisfac tiol.
2nd:-

To establish a defense on the ground of

insanity, it must be clearly proven that at the time

of committing thu

offense

the party accused was labor-

iig under such a defect of r,asou caused
the mind as not to know the
or that

act h_- was doin3rd:sion only.

If

it

Uature and

by disease

jiality of the

was wrong.

the accitsed labor under a partial
not in

and is

of

other respects

deluhe

insane,

must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if th3 facts in respect to which thr. delusion
e)2ists were real.
The courts of

lew York State adopted the rule as

laid dowa by the iviCauhten case in the trial of Freeman vs. People,

I Denio 9, in which it is said:

"That

if the prisoner knew the act was wrong at the time he
comitted it,

he is responsible."

The rule

)s laid

down by this case has be en followed anfd it the law of
this state
In

to-day.

the case of Flaia an vs.

State,

b2 _J". Y.

pa-e

467, this rule was assailed, and an attempt made to
have the court reco-7;ie the fact that the knowledge
test was not always the true one.

The court said: "The

law rco-nizes no form of insanity, it is declared, in
which the capacity of distinguishing right from wron ,
without the power of choosing between them."

"The vague-

,LeSS

and uncertainty

in juiry are deemed to ren-

of this

der the doctriiie daii>j,.rous

-mid ii"expedijit."

Penal Code of U.ew York S tate
defiuition

of insaiity

is

auad the

when iisanity

sibility
in

was euacted

is

test

pleaded,

harmony with the definition

in

7h.!± the
1882,

of criminal

the

re:spoa-

was not changed and
as established by the

case.

,cTuhten

The question of .hat

was the true test

of crimin-

al liability wheL insanity was pleaded came up in the
case of Loefles vs.
"Insanity,in

its

State, 10 Ohio St.

general legal sense,

The court said,
is

the

inability

or incapacity to distinguish right from wron- as applied to particular cases of crimes;
to distinguish right

from wrong is

when the ability

overcome

or destroy-

ed or the knowledge of such distinction is buried in
oblivion, such a fact would make

a perpetrator irres-

pousible. "
Ii, the United States

the test of right and wrong

has generally been followed.
v'icalue,

1 Curtis,

U.

S.

structed the jury "that

Ct.,

In the case of U. S. vs.
Chief Justice

Curtis in-

the question for them to decide

was whether the prisoner understood the nature of the
act,

and knew he was doing wrong,

and if he did, he

would d: serve punishment.

In
1

Moury,

follows:

the state of hwLsas in the case of State vs.
Lac. 483,

the court direct,:.d the jiry

as

"If the defendant was laboring under such

a

defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature or quality of the act he was doin-:, then
the law does not hold him responsible for his acts;

on

the other hand, if he was capable of understanding
what ho was doing and had the power to know his act
was wrong, the law will hold him criminally responsible
for it.

If this power of discrimiation enists, he

will not bw exempted from punishment

because he is a

person of weak intellect or one whose mind or moral
perceptions are blunted, or because his mind may be
depressed or distracted from brooding over distractions or disappointment, or because he may be wrought up
to the most intense mental eicitement from sentiments
of jealousy, anger oN revenge.

The law recognizes no

form of insanity, although the mental faculties may be
destroyed or deranged, so long as
the crime knew what he

the person committing

was doing and that the act was

wrong. 9

It will be easily seen upon an examination of the
cases which follow the right and wrong ruls as the t-lue

based upori priuciples

one, that they are all

lished in the T1Ac-auhten case,
and also on the

precedents,

followii-

as estab-

old rules

theory that to reco

nize
in

would introduce a rule daiigerous

any other test

and

its

effect, which would defeat the protection which the
law affords to the people against the acts of criminals,

and would allow many to escape punishment who in

fact deserved it,

but all

courts as well as medical au-

thorities have not clung to the right and wrong test as
the true one, and they have adopted a more perfect and
justice seeking rule.

It is almost aedless to add)

that in the courts which only recognize the right
wrong test,

one affected by an insane delusion or ir-

resistible
in

and

impulse caused by disease of the mind,

the same situation

bility

as if

in

is

regard to criminal responsi-

he was one who had the strongest mind un-

affected by disease.
Ii
State,

the
23 '!.

state
E.

have sufficient
wrong,

of Indiana in
273$,

it

the case of Flake vs.

was held "that

mental capacity

to know right

aid to be able to comprehend

sequences

of his

ble for his acts;

acts,
for if

a person may
from

the nature

ad

con-

and not be criminally responsithe will power is

so impaired

23.

that

he

mit crime,
It

impulse to com-

ca(Lnot r,_.Sist a± irresistible

is

he is

not of sou'd mi:ad."
the same case,

also held in

if

the lack of

will power is the result of disease of the mifid there
is

no criminal responsibility,

is

simply overcome

the will power

by ungoverned passions,

criminal rasponsibility,
96 Ind.

but if

aiid Cenway vs.

citin ) Goodwin vs.

State,

doubtedly thz law of ldiina,

118 Ind.
and it

there is
State,

This is

un-

shows how the

courts of that state refused to follow the early rule
as laid down by the courts of that stats, which at first
reco-aized the

right

and wrongs rule as the true

The capacity to disti~iuish between ri-ht

guide.

,ud

wronz' has been discarded. as the true test ii all cases
in the state of Iowa, and it has been held that if a
person conunitted a homocide knowin-

it

was wron-,

did so under the influence of an ucontrollable

but
and ir-

resistible impulse, arising not from natural passion
but from an insane condition of the mind, he is not
crimiiially rlsponsible.

In the case of State vs. Tel-

,ter, 2e Iowa 68, Judge Dillion said, "If by the observation and conmcrrent testimony of medical men who
make the study of inYsanity a specialty,

it

should ce

definitely

ulisould co-dition
ditioi

to be true that

established

of the mind,

of the mind in

-a ziven act is

wron-,

is

nu,,

a diseased con-

is

though a person knows

which,
he is

that

thore

that

yet by an insane impulse,

that is an impulse proceeding from disense of the mind,
irresistibly driven to commit it, the law must modify
its

aacient doctrine

to this condition,

and recognise

when it

is

the

truth

satisfactorily

aJid give
shown to

exist, its exculpation.
A very late
of insanity is
Rep.

532,

a

anid ifistrutctive case on the subject

the case of State vs.

case decided in

Comegys said,

"It

Reidell,

Dolaware,

seems at first

in

14

Alt.

which Judge

view very uDireasol-

able to suppose that one who is capable of knowing
right from wrong should be entirely able to decide
betwenn them if he choose to do so,
known fact

but it is a well

that such capacity of knowledge may be per-

fect enough in an individual and yet he may be unable,
from destruction
brain which is

or impairment

of that function of the

con'nected with the will,

what he knows to

to avoid doing

be wrong."

It was formerly held that the old rule was the
test in Pennsylvania, but it was overruled in the cast
of Coyle vs.

Cor,

100 Pa.,

in which it is said, 'that

there

may be

dra,, ing it

ai -,unseen li

meiit previion.

to cons- ;iences which it

avoid,

a~1 d placing it

result

is

seen,

under the

sees

the mind

bat ca- not

coercion which its

but the mind is incapable of resist-

anice. "

The question of what was to be accepted as the
true test
vs.

of iLisanity came up in

State, 2 So. Rep. A\la.

lowing rules:

"The

right oLid wroiig,

the case of Parsons

The Judge laid down the fol-

capacity to distinguish between

whether abstractedly or as applied to

the particular act, as a. legal test of insanity and
respoitsibility for crime is repudiated by the modern
legal and medical authorities, who lay down the followin-

rules and which the court now adopts:

(1) Where

there is no such capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong as applied to the particular act, there is no
legal responsibility.

(2) Where there is such capa-

city, a defendant is nevertheless not legally responsible if by reason of the du.ress of mental disease he
has so far lost the power to choose between them as not
to -avoid doing the act in question, so his fre, agency
was at the time destroyed, and at the time the alleged
crime was so connected with such mental disease in relation of cause and effect as to have been the product

or offspriig

of it

delusionaal

insaiity

solely."

and the e.istence

of insanity,
is

sni

aid necessarily

old rule laid down by the
case,

"The

r2l

applies

conflicts

Judges in

to

with the

the 14jcaughten

or non-exist. ,ce of the disease

such as may fall

a quesLion for the jury,

within the above

rules,

enlightened by the testi-

mony of experts."
k very notable instance
ians re-ard

showing how the physic-

the old rule as a test

criminal

responsibility

defe.se,

is

when insanity is

found in

at the british

for determining

the followin,

pleaded as a

resolution passed

kssociation of TKedical Officers

lums and Kospitals for the Inasane,

of ksy-

held July 14,

where there was 64 medical officers:

1887,

"Resolved, that so

much of the legal test of mental condition of an alleged
criminal lunatic

as renders him a responsible

agent be-

and wrong,

cause he knows the differnce

betweena right

is

well known to every mem-

inconsistent

with the fact

ber of this meeting, the power to distinguish between
right and wrong 'eists in those who are often associated with

_an-erous

and uacontrollable

N somewhat peculiar doctrine eiists
shire:
jected,

all

tests

of insmLity as matters

atid neither delusions,

delusions."
in 7Tew Y ampof law are re-

hallucinations,

nor

knowledge of right and wrong affords any inflexible
test of criminal responsibility, bit all symptoms of
disease and its effects upon the faculties are submitted to the jury, and the testimony of non-expert wits , is
nse

excluded.

In

the case of State vs. Pike, 49 71.K. 399, Judge

Doe said, "It was for a long time supposed that men
however insane, if they knew the act was wrong could
refraini from doing it, but whether that supposition
was correct or not is a question for the jury.

The

knowledge test in all its forms and the delusion test
are medical theories introduced in the

immature stages

of science in the dim light of early times, and subsequently upon more exte a sive observations and more
critical examination, repudiated by the medical profession. "
"When the authorities of the comion law began
to deal with insanity, they adopted the prevailing medical theories, and the distinction between the duty of
the court to decide questions of fact did not exist,
and was not appreciated and observed then as it now is
in this state."

Moral Inlsanity.

moral insanity,

Uder the d(,rcisioiis of the state3,

nor exemptioia from pnnishment, the refor' under

for crime,

the decisions
Pac.

no e-icUSJ

is

from mental derangeriient,

as distiii-tisheJ

"It

849.

as a defense

of Califorija,

F-opl3 vs.

K*,

was held not error to state

in a charge
the Joc-

of insanity that the law rejects

trine of what is

14

r'ijt,

called moral insanity which begins

the eve of the criminal

act and einds when the

on

act is

committed."

Isanity resulting from Intoxication.

UIthough drunkeness
for crime,

is

yet mental unsouindiess

brought about by ii-

toxication may e ,cuse when the mind is
!oig continuance
a person is

or excuse

no palliation

destroyed by

of the habit of drunkeness, and wh-n

insanie

at the time of conritt1;i

the crime,

he is not punishable although such insanity be remotely caused by undue indulgence
from what in

a moral seise is

in
a

spirituous liiuors,

or

criminal neglect

of du-

ty, for if the reason be affected or destroyed by a fined disease, although brought about by the defendant's
own vices, the law holds him not responsible, but temporary ins uity resultiig from intoxicationi does not in
most states destroy responsibility or constitute a defenn e to crime, but when the question is whether a muarder is

of first or second degree, the fact of the

drunkeness may be

shown to prove the mental condition

of the accused to determine whether or not the killing
resulted from a deliberate and premeditated purpose,
see Colbath vs. State JY,
7
: !,
k fixed frenzy or insanity or delirium tremens
destroys all legal responsibility, and although induced
by voluntary intoxication, is a good defense, providing the mental condition za
to other forms of insanity;
Vvich. 401.

stand the tests applied
see Roberts vs. People, 10

It is also well settled by the law since

the time of Lord Hale, that if a person be made drunk
by fraud or stratagem of another or by the iinskilfulness of a physician, he is not responsible for his acts
committed while under the influence of the drugs or
liquors thus taken;

see Roberts vs. State, NV

General Statement of the Law,
constitute

of what Iasanity will

a defenise to Criminal

The law does not re uire,
criminil respoi-sibility,
ties iL fitll

kcts.

as to the conldition of

the possession of one' s fficul-

,igor, uiimpaired by disease or ilfirmity.

The mi-id may be weake-ed by disease or impaired,
yet the accused be criminally respolisible.
discharge himself from risponsibility,
by proving that his intllect

not to do.

d that it

li,3re irresistible

He can only
most states,

was so disordered that

he did not know the nature and
was cori1 ittin.-,

in

aJ.

1uality of the act he

was ani act that he ought
impulse to commit murder

by reason of mental deraninemeat at the time of the act
is not a defense, in most states, as long as the accused knew the act he was conmitting was wrong and punish~ble by the law.

ioral insanity is

considered no

excuse for crime.

The law rejects the doctrine of e-

motional iasanity,

and thorough it

is

not so definite

on the subject of insane delusions, it is almost a settled priaciple in

a majority of the states,

at least

for the present, that a del'ision caused by disease or
otherwise is no defense for a criminal act.
This seems to be the law, as derived from the

decisions revie ,Tjd, as near Ii my vocabulary will ,xpress it, but for a closer analysis of the

subjcrt aiid

for th,2 purpose of determiing whit is the la'v in each
stat,- upoli the subject, it seems to me, after a.L exam-

ination of the state and the U -ited 5 tates courts,
that three rules may be formulated, and that all the
states have followed some one
Jetermilatilon
is pleaded.

of crimii±al responsibility
The rules are

i:ex.ist in

igan,

na,

The ri-ht

Oregon,

Tennessee,

states:

'(5,eor ia,

insanity

as follows:

Kent-acky,

Texas,

whi1-

aid wrong test

the followinc

T"ew Jersey,

fornia,

of these rules for the

may be said to

Uew York,

iinesota,

Ohio,

Colorado,

South Carolina,

,ebraska and all

Mlich-

Cali-

> orth Jaroli-

the

other states

not givean under either of the two followiu- rules.
Secoiid:-

To the test

of knowledge

of righit aid

wrong is added an element of the power of the accused
to cortrol his acts and apply his sense of the moral
nature of his acts.
are the folowi
>aryland,

Iowa,

Third: -

ng:
Illi

The states which follow this rule
Pe.nnsylvania,
lois,

klabama,

Llassachusetts

The question

Delaware,

and !Tst

Vir-

of the defend r.t' s respons-

ibility is left in broad general terms to the jury;

this rule is

followedI iL 7.ew T'ampshire.

The question of which one of these3
followed,

when our statute makers come to frame a uni-

',
N on the subject,

\ersal

rules shall be

seems to be whether aii old

rule of legal resposibility shall be adh -f-'to,
based on the theories of physicianis promul-ateJ
dred years aLo,

which refused to recognize any insanity

which would exempt from punishment,
test

of mental

a hun-

except the single

capacity to distinziuish right froii wr'on-7,

or whether the statute makers, when they come to frame
a statute, will recognize as a possible fact, if capable
of proof by clear a Id satisfactory testimony, the doctrine now alle-ed by those of the medical profession
who have made insanity a special subject of inivesti--ationi,

that the old test is wrong and that there is no

single test by which the existence of the disease to that
de-gree which exempts from pu--ishment,
be detected.
by tiz

can in

every case

The ilLquiry must not be unduly obstructeld

doctrine of stare decisis, for the life of the

law and scientific discourses and the requirements of
an ever advancing civilization call for
knowledge test

. change of the

as the only aad true test.

There is inherent in a change of the knowledge
test the

vital

principle of judicial evolution, which

preseuts itself

by a constait stri-1<gle for app'o2 ima-

tion to the highest wisdom.

U:,d2r the present state of our law, as adopted
by the states which follow the rule laid down in th_
,ciaulhten case, we are co.rfronted

with the practical

difficulty which itself demonstrates the defects of the
rule.

The courts in effect charge the juries, as mat-

ters of Taw, that no such mental disease exists as that
ofte

testified to by physicians, superintendents of in-

sane hospitals and other experts;

that there canot be

as a matter of scientific fact any defect of the mind
which destroys the person of self control or his liberty of action, providing only hz. relains a i,_ntal consciousness of right and wrong.

The experts are irmmed-

iately put under oath aiid tell the juries just the contrary as matters of evidei±ce,

asserting that no one of

ordinary intelligence can spend an hour in the
an insane

,ards of

asylum without discovering such cases, and

in fact that the whole maniagemient of such institu: tions
presupposes a knowledge of right and wron- on the part
of their inmates.

The practical result in most cases

Ls that the jijJ-es char-e one way a i; the jury follow
lx'
ahw of humanlity arid find in

an alleed hi
with th-3 evidenace,
affairs soon upoi.

but we hope for a
-til

these poiints,

so

to my knowledge,

of

better state
in

from its universality, laJks humanity,
mrit of' our law,

harmony

which the law,
and ii. no depart-

does the law work

reat iLijustice in most states as it does in that

of insanity as a defense to criminal acts.

Evidence.

As the conclusions of the jury relative to the
existence

of insanity must necessarily be founded

oli

the testimony offered by the parties, it is the subject
of the utmost importaiice by whom this testimony shall
be given, and the amount of evidence which will
fy an acuittal.

justi-

If the decisions of this point were

purely matters of facts, the only duty of the jury
would be to see that they were sufficient for the purpose and proceed upoa authentic sourc,.s;
contrary, it

is

but on the

a matter of -nfernacp to be drawn from

a certain data, and this is a duty for which our juries,
as at

present constituted, are unfit.

"That a body of

men taken from the common walks

of lifu

should be re-

quired to decide whether or not certain opinions and
facts in evidence prove derangement of mind, or, in
other words, to decide a professional question of a
very delicate nature and involving some of the highest interests of men, is an idea so preposterous that
one finds it difficult at first sitht to believe that
it was ever seriously entertained."

But such is the

law as imposed upon us by custom, and we must make the
best of it.

We must know the rules of evidence to be

aaywhere near perfect.

Burden of Proof.

The question of the sufficiency of the proof of
insanity which must be adduced, and as to the effect
it must produce upon the jury in order to justify a
verdict of acquittal, is no nearer settled than the
question of what ins_nity will excuse for crime.
courts seem to all agree on this proposition:

The

That

the state must prove all the facts necessary to constitute the crime, among which is the fact that the
defendant was of sane mind when he comitted the crime,
but here is where the law steps in aud helps the state

by th3 legal presi:imptioa
the

to prove

no evideice given

siJe,

move this

presumption is
and this

opinion exists,
how -rea't

trates

rd!pre-

but upon

to carry a couviction,

sufficient

!e<al

there is

and if
the le

isa-ity,

is

uestion of how much evidence

the

saie until

every man is

shown by either

-'ontrary is

sumption is

that

where

minids differ,

illus-

the same

wheni,havini

they arrive

pre mises from which to reaso,

of

the diversity
of opinion

difference

to re-

required

at contrary

Co ac lus i ons.

The adjudications upoii this

juestioi

may be prop-

erly brought under some one of the followin- rules,

as

deduced from the decisions of the courts of the United
States.
ist.
question

It
of fact

has

b en held that

insanity

to be poven like any other fact,

a-cusesl was insane at the time

act,

the case of State vs.

the judg-e said,
there

is

"The

of committing

the

for an aciittal.

should be deemed sufficient
In

and

the jury that

any evidence which reasonably satisfies
the

a simple

is

Reid3ll,

14-

lt.

aeo,

law holds every man against whom

proof of the commission of a crime to have

been of sane mind when he did it.

This presumption,

however, may be overcome by proof providing it be sat-

isfactory to thz jury.
I;, the case of' (iter
it

was held,

"that iris

,ilty

vs.

Etate

(Alabama) 3 So.

must b,2 established3

a preponderance of exidence

300

by

a.1d that a reasonable

doubt does not authorize -n acquittal;
both to the fact of insanity aid th

and this applies

conection be-

tween it and th;3 crime.
This rule is followed ii the followiii' states:
Alabama, Delaware, Teias, 1-enisylvania, Ohio, Iowa,
krkazusas

acid Kansas.

2nd.

It has been held that where a person is

accused of the commission of a crime and pleads that
he was

inisane at the

crime,

evidence of sufficient wei.'ht to raise in the

minids

time of the

commission of the

of the jury a r )aonable doubt of defendant's

sanity at the time the act was committed
him to an ac nuittal.

This rule was early laid down i,.

the cast of McCann vs. People, 16 7. Y.,
Judge Pr'own

said,

man to c, sane,

"That

blit t1

while

the people

in

which

the law presumed every

hein
1a
1
the prisoner introduced

pr.:of to show his irsanity, the
upo

entitled

burden of proof devolved

to prove his sanity,like any other

matter of fact, heyond -a reasonable doubt, and the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of any doubt restin.
upon the

uestion of. his sanity, s-a~ity is a necessaLry

condition to constitut
sumption of

the cilme,

when the pre-

-nd

sanity has beei i-',moved. by eviden-e

show-

in- insanity, the prosecution must prove the sanity
beyond a reasonable
tioii."

doubt in order to

secure a coavic-

This decision was not followed by the subse-

uent court of New York State, a.id there was much conflAsion in the decisions for many years, until at last
the courts have settled the law in this state as follows:

Every man is presumed sane.

If any evide ice

is given by either party teadin- to show the prisoner
i isa-ie

at the time of the copnmmittin-, of the offense al-

1e7ed, then the

b.;rden of proof is upon the prosecu-

tion and there remains until the end of the trial, and
in order to secure a conviction, the prosecutor must
prove the sanity of the defendant at the time of the
alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the
jury have a. reasonable doubt of the sanity of the prisoner at the time of the cormmitting of the act, they
must -rive him the be.:-iefit of it
be further

added:

that

aid acquit,

if the jury are fairly

ly instructed that a reasonable doubt
upon the question of insanity entitles

in

their

ajd it

may

acid plainrninds

the prisoner to

a-1 acquittal, aid that is all that is necessary to embody in the charge, and any nice distinctions as to
the burden of proof and affirmative of issue are un-

iecessary and immaterial;
People vs.

Walker,

O'Coninell vs.

see
88 TI.

People,

Y.

87 I.

81.
Y.

377.

In the case of Chase vs. People, 40 Illinois 302,
the jid-e said that "If insanity is relied upon, and
any evidence is -iven to establish that unfortunate
condition of the mind, and a reasonable well founded
doubt is thereby created of the sanity of the accused,
every principle of jlistice and humanity demand the accused shall have the beniefit of it.

We do not desire to

be understood as holding the prosecution to the proof
of sanity in any case, but we do hold, where evidence
of insanity has been introduced by the accused and a
reasonable doubt of his saaity is

thereby created,

the

accused cannot be convicted of the crime Charged."
This rule has been adopted in the followinT
states:

Te.nessee,

Mississippi,
3rd.

1,1ew York,

New Hampshire,

NTevada,

Indiana and Illinois.
It has been held that insomuch as the pre-

sumption of i:-nocence attends the defendant on trial

and

the presumption of sanity likewise attenads the case
of the state,

the same amount of evideice is

to remove one presumption as the other.

requisite

kad since the

state

must establish

a reasonable

the guailt of the

doubt,

so the defendant,

itstanity for his defense,

teyond
when he pleads

must establish

oeyonid a rea-

it

sonable doubt.
There were only two states
this rule by judicial
and Delaware,
it

decisions;

butt Delaware

and tow follows the first

article.

which ever adopted
they were )(ew

Jersey

has since refused to follow
rule

as -iven

in

this

It seems that by statute Oregon has also ad-

opted this rule,

and it

when insanity is

pleaded,

his iisanity

is

provided
that th,

beyond a reasonable

in

the

statute

that

defendant must prove

doubt in

order to se-

cure an acquittal.
It

will easily be seen upon an examiatio'

the cases oin insanity,

and especially

question of the burden of proof,
ually appeari, i
and perhaps
meaiis

it

stalitial

those upon the
there is

contin-

before us the term reasonable doubt,
would not be out of place to -ive

of the term as it

cisions of the courts.
ot mea,

that

of

seems to

be used in

The term reasonable

every vague or conjectural doubt;
doubt arisin-

from the

evidence

the

the de-

doubt does

but a

sub-

or lack of ev-

ideace inconsistent with the theory of the defendant's
_uilt.

The jud-e should accurately e<plain the term to

the jury in

each case,

and a charge:

should be convinced as jurors when
vinced as ,yie-n,

"that

the jury

they would be con-

and doubt as jurors when they should

doubt as men."has been held to be correct char-e in
criminal cases where

insanity was pleaded as a defense.

In the case of Spies vs. People, 112 Illinois,
the court defined a reasonable doubt to be such a doubt
as,if it were interposed in the graver transactions of
life, it would cause a reasonable man to hesitate and
pause.

If it is such a doubt it is sufficieit to au-

thorize a verdict of not guilty.

If after a consider-

ation of all the evidence you can say you have an abidin-

conavictioi

isfied

4yj a

of the truth

of the

reasonable doubt.

charge,

you are sat-

The rule of what is a

reasonable doubt, as thus formulated, has been approved
by the courts of the United States.

Under the head of Evidence - What is Admissible.

All expert testimony is admissible and competent
because it is by such testimony that the enisteice of
the disease of insanity ca,

be established,

but the val-

ue of such testimony ought to depend mainly upon the

experience, fidelity and impartiality of the witness who
gives

it,

triers

its

desicff

bein.j to aid the judgment of the

of the case in re'ard to the effect and influ-

ence of certain facts which lie out of the observation,
knowledge

and experience of persons in general, but no

jury ought to give more weight to expert opinions
deciding

the case than,

thi.ik such opinions fairly

oi the whole
merit.

It

testimony,
is

in

they

the duuy of the

court to decide who are really experts withini the meaning of the law before their evidence is -iven,

so as

to be entitled to the weight of expert testimony.

When

the evidence is conflicting, both as to the facts and
thei opinions of medical experts, as to the prisoner's
mania, a physicianri ca.inot be asked his opinion of the
actual case shown by the evideace, since that would
tend to usurp the function of the jury;
&unter, 3 So. 600.

see State vs.

When the question of whether the

defendant has recovered from an attack of insanity aad
had been confined in an insane asylum, the superinteuide .t of the asylum may be allowed to testify for either
side.

In some states the court requires that the ex-

perts state the facts upon which they base their opinions,

or are given a hypothetical

case and their

opin-

ions required, but this rule is not followed in all the

and in

states,
3657,

the cawe

of State vs.

Pritchet,

ii

S.

E.

a physicia:i who had known the defendant well for

a loui2 time

and had frequent conversations

was allowed to give his opinions

with him,

as an expert,

as to the

sanity,

though his opinion was not based oa the evidence

adjuced

on the trial,

lot only is

or on a hypothetical
expert testimony allowed,

case.
but in

most states non-experts are allowed to testify, but
they are never allowed to

give their

upon a hypothetical case,

and as a

opinions

based

-.eaeral rule they

are required to state the facts upon which they base
their

opinions,

to the jury,

thus givinT the jury the

chatice to judge of the correctness of their conclusions,

but in

some states

has been held that non-

it

experts, who have had the opportunity to observe the
facts, and did in fact observe them, may state their
opiinion of the defendant' s

sanity without giving any

facts upon which their opinion is based.

e'ere stands the law of insanity so far
in this production as it is,
of it:

as given

and there is plenty more

in fact our digests bristle with cases on the

subject.

It is a very prevalent defense to criminal

acts because of its

prevalency

derstand me to say that

as a disease.

Don't un-

the fact of insanity being en-

tered as a plea is very c'±clusive evidence of its
existeice,

but it

is

mands of the age call

certainly evideit that the defor a more competent method of

investigatin- into the vagaries of this malady.
,aenerally speaking life is as sweet to one man
as to another.

A man who takes the

life

of a fel-

low maii has either a dark malevolent disposition, or
some

certain disease of the mind over which he has no

control.
is

The former all nature cries out a-ainst.

a man to be shunned,

inane

man asks in

a man to

be exterminated.

Fe
The

words more pitying thau mouth can

utter, that he should not be punished for deeds done
but entirely

foreign to his volition,

the volition of the human race.
weakness

of minid,

as they are

to

Wlhy men, because of

should be exempt from civil

respons-

ibility, and liable for acts over which they have no
control,

is

a problem too deep for human reason6

Metaphysics,

in

its

present condition,

ly incompetent to fuLiriish a

satisfactory

of the phenomona of insanity,

and

is

utter-

explanation

a more deplurable

waste of ingermity can hardly be imagined than is

wit-

nessed in the modern attempt to reconcile the facts

of the

oie with the other.
As a suggestion iin coiiclusion,

the popular mind is
and impartial
aad that

let

me s'.y,

that

e-itirely uiifitteJd for a careful

itivestigatiou of the plea of insanity,

the meiTital coudition of the accused

be examined into by men,

who have

should

become fitted

for

such duties by a peculiar course of study and experience.
in-

The court is not the man,

because his train-

and all his experience has laid down one rule for

him:
dent.

"Few

to the line."

Fe knows but one word -

prece.

The jury of ordiniary men,as now chosen, is in-

competent

because of feelings of vengea:ace

the bloody deeds

of the accused.

protection of the accused insane

excited by

Let us have for the
the universal

adop-

tion of the statute proposed in this article, with the
adlition

of medical experts as a court for this

of ou~r jurisprudence.

branich

